Mehlaqa Samdani is a consultant and advisor to the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project (on Pakistan-US relations) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to her work with CSIS, she was a researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations, where she examined the role of women in effecting social, political and economic change in the Islamic world.

Samdani previously managed political development projects in Pakistan where she trained women in rural Punjab to contest local council elections within the framework of the Devolution Plan. She has actively been involved with track-two peace initiatives between India and Pakistan and has participated in a number of peace conferences.

Over the past ten years she has also carried out research and humanitarian/development work in various conflict settings, including Bosnia, the Sudan, Israel/Palestine and Afghanistan.

Samdani is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has an undergraduate degree from the University of Denver.

Q. Mehlaqa, we would like to find out a bit about you, your choices towards making this journey? 

A. Well, for the first 19 years of my life, I had little idea of what direction I wanted to take.  I was born and raised in Lahore exceptfor a short period of four years when my family moved to England as a result of a self-imposed exile.  I was 7 years old at the time.    This was during Zia’s regime and as a High Court Judge, my father refused to take the oath, leaving him jobless at the time.  We returned when I was 11, and I remained in Pakistan after that.  I graduated from Kinnaird with a bachelors degree in English Literature and Philosophy but was unsure about what  I wanted to do.   

So, at a family friend’s suggestion, I decided to apply to the University of Denver (DU)  with the hope of developing a better sense for where my interests lay.  So in 1996, I came out to DU for my undergraduate.  At that time, there were a number of ethnic conflicts taking place all across the globe: in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Bosnia, and of course the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  As I became exposed to these crises, my interest in International Relations grew and I found that all these conflicts had one thing in common–Muslims.  Either they were the perpetrators or the victims.  As a Muslim with a strong Muslim identity, I became deeply interested in these issues.  

Also, while there were quite a few international students at DU, there were very few Muslim students and so, invariably I would find myself being the Muslim voice in a lot of my classes.  The experience really helped crystallize my Muslim identity and compelled me to understand/respond/contribute to these issues at whatever level I could.   

And here I have to say that I was very much supported in my interest and quest by DU’s faculty, and my family in Denver and Pakistan.  I got the opportunity to go to Bosnia and Palestine to explore conflict issues not just academically, but by experiencing them on the ground.  Through extensive interviews,  I also explored the humanitarian dimension of these conflicts and got a sense of what young people were thinking about the issue. 

Q.  How did you come about visiting these conflict regions?

A.  Well, I felt the need to really understand these conflicts but what we were being told in the Western media, was a very one-sided view.  So I decided that there was no real good way to understand except to be on the ground.  Obviously as a Pakistani, it was very difficult to figure out a way to get to Palestine and Israel.  After consulting my professors, we figured out that the best way to travel to Israel would be to not stamp my passport with an Israeli visa.  I would have travel documents that would allow me entry but not an official visa.   

I was in Palestine/Israel for about a month and lived in the old city in Jerusalem.  As a student myself,  I was interested in hearing the students’ perspective on the Wye peace agreement that had just been signed between Netanyahu and Arafat.  I therefore interviewed young people affiliated with was able to speak to students affiliated with, Hamas, Fatah, Labour, Likud as well as  Jewish American students who were studying the Torah over there, so I got a whole spectrum of student views on the conflict.   

I decided to do my Bachelor’s thesis on this subject – the student perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, how it differed from what policymakers on both sides were saying and whether there was room to bridge the gap.   

Q.  While you were gathering this information, were you able to move about freely?

A.  It was fairly easy to move around in Jerusalem.  But traveling to the West Bank from Jerusalem was an eye opener because then you really got to experience the check posts that everyday Palestinians have to go through on a daily basis.  The signs of occupation just stare you in the face as you do this commute and it really drives home the point of what it means to live under occupation.   

While talking to students in Bethlehem, I could sense how strongly they felt about their inability to be able to pray at the Al-Aqsa mosque, while I, a Pakistani, an American could come and go as I pleased.   

It was also interesting how I would switch between my Pakistani and American identity – when I was talking to a Palestinian, I would declare myself a Pakistani, while if I was speaking with Israelis, I would say I’m from United States.  Both statements were true and they allowed me to develop a connection with both parties. 

Q.  As muslims, we come with the baggage of having a certain perspective on the conflict.  Were you able to put this aside and be more objective?

A.  Well, we can’t completely get rid of that baggage, specially since growing in Pakistan instills in us a sense for which ‘side’ we should be on.  But I was there in the capacity of a researcher and for me, it was not that difficult to relate to students across the spectrum.  When I met with Israeli students, I could understand that their fear was real  So I could understand their perspective, even if I did not agree with it necessarily.  I was trying to be as intellectually honest as I could be.  I had come up with the same number of questions for both parties, making sure that the questionnaire’s wording was not going to be perceived as biased by any party.   

I also had the opportunity to live in West Jerusalem with some Israelis and Jewish Americans.  I attended Synagogue with them and participated in Shabbat dinners.  I was really impressed with their commitment to their religion, their level of hospitality, their passion for the Torah, the situation, their identity as Jews and their determination to contribute positively to their society.  And just observing these traits inspired me to become a better Muslim, and to take more of an interest in Muslim affairs.   

Of course with the Palestinians, you immediately feel a sense of empathy.  But I did try to ask the hard questions.   

Q.  Do you find that because of the explosive nature of this issue, you might have been stamped in a particular way?

A.  It is unfortunate that we cannot have an objective discourse on this subject.  But I feel that there is an increasing level of awareness in American policy circles that it is not in American interest to put Israeli interests before America’s own.  It does require a certain level of courage to speak out and there are a number of people, including some academics who are starting to broach this subject: to take the personal out of the issue, and to talk objectively about policies.  But there still remains a great deal of resistance to speaking out against Israeli policies as the Israeli Lobby is very strong and there is no counter to that at this point. 

Unfortunately both sides are so deeply entrenched in their own point of views, that they do not explore the issue from any angle except their own.  The Israelis have their own news sources and the Arabs their own and so it gets very hard to begin bridging the gap.  But the conflict is such that in the words of Desmond Tutu, we cannot be neutral - to be neutral is to perpetuate violence.  Even as social scientists, neutrality loses its value at some point.  It’s ok to be neutral when you are trying to mediate, but when you are analyzing the situation and trying to put forth solutions, you have to recognize and articulate what is unjust. 

Q. What work did you do in Pakistan?

A.  After graduating from DU,  I returned to Pakistan in September 1999, shortly after which Musharraf staged a coup.  In October of that year, Musharraf announced the Devolution of Power framework in which he attempted to reintroduce governance through local bodies.  It was also a way to develop grassroots political engagement and activism.  One aspect of this framework was to get women 33% representation at the local council level. 

And so while I was working for Citizens Commission for Human Development, we got involved in a project to train women to contest local council elections.  We focused on women in 26 various districts in Punjab and we tried to impart information regarding what it means to govern, what their responsibilities are, how to identify projects for the betterment of their community.  Most of these women had no prior experience doing any type of work – they were housewives with little to no education.  But what they had was an ambition to do good for their community.  The women did meet with a lot of resistance from the male members of their family/community but what they had was the support of the NGO and government.  So they came forward quite enthusiastically to contest the elections. 

Q.  How much time did you spend with the Citizens’ Commission?

A.  I was there for almost two years. 

Q.  After that you decided to pursue your Masters?

A.  I did.  By this time I had decided that I wanted to hone in on Conflict Resolution as my field, having had both academic as well as practical education in the subject.  So I applied to Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts and pursued my graduate work there.   

While at Fletcher, I had the opportunity to travel to Sudan.  I was studying the nexus between peace and development work: how humanitarian work, development work, political development and conflict resolution, could work together towards peace building in post-conflict countries.  So, in Sudan I looked at how micro-credit projects could bring together warring communities/tribes in Southern Sudan – whether development and development activity could actually alleviate some of the animosities that existed between warring factions.   

Q.  What led you to your current work at CSIS?

A.  After graduation from Fletcher, I worked at the Council for Foreign Relations in New York.  I was focused on US Foreign Policy and Women and looked at the role of women in affecting socio-economic and political change in the Islamic world.  During this time, I had my baby and felt that I wasn’t able to do justice to both family and work.   And so I took off time to be with my family and moved back to Massachusetts where my husband is based. 

And then as things would have it, through a Fletcher classmate of mine at CSIS, I got involved in the new project that they were launching that deals with Pakistan-US relations.  Co-incidentally, I was going to Pakistan for a vacation at that time, and so I was able to combine some preliminary research with the trip.  And so, when CSIS got funding for the project, I got offered the consultancy.  The project sought to increase dialogue between the US and Pakistan on issues of mutual interest and allowed me the opportunity to bring a variety of Pakistani voices to policymakers in Washington.   

Q.  So this how you were able to manage the work/life balance?

A.  I have two young kids (3 and 2), so had to work around their schedules.  However, because my work entailed mostly research and writing policy recommendations, I could do so during their naps and after they went to bed.  My project directors in Washington were also very understanding and scheduled teleconference meetings around my children’s schedules.  It wasn’t always easy and quite exhausting at times, but with my husband’s cooperation and support I was able to get the necessary work done. 

I think it is very important for all of us to have something of our own – in terms of our career, in terms of personal growth, because after a while of changing diapers, your brain ceases to function unless stimulated by intellectual pursuits.  So I would say to everyone to do something for yourself, even while you are in the haze of baby rearing.  As women, as mothers, we do have to make sacrifices and I had to scale back some of my ambitions too.  But it is really about continuing to follow your passion, continuing to study, and to find whatever avenues available in whatever situation  we happen to be in.   

There was a time, when my kids were just born and I wasn’t working, that I started writing.  I said to myself, I still have a brain, I still have my writing skills and I can read and so I can help myself by keeping abreast of what is happening in my field.  So when this consultancy opportunity came along, I really felt like I was ready to take on this work.       

Q.  What advice can you give to others who might want to enter this field?

A.  I would encourage those without prior experience to be willing to volunteer or intern with organizations that are doing interesting work.  It’s a good way to get your foot in the door, make contacts and also determine whether this is something you are genuinely interested in.  Another way of course is also to read as much as possible and try and write blogs or articles on areas of one’s interest.   Sometimes it is also worthwhile to directly contact individuals whose work one admires and inquire about their career paths to get ideas about how to move forward.   

Q.  Please tell us a bit about Swat and what your opinion is regarding the peace deal?

A.  While the Swat peace agreement was widely seen as a capitulation by the government to the demands of militants in Swat, I believe it was an important step in bringing some respite to the people of Swat, who had suffered immensely over the past 18 months.  Military operations launched by the government a year and a half ago, as well as acts of terrorism perpetrated by militant groups in the area had led to the displacement of over 400,000 Swatis as well as the deaths of 1200 people.   

Now that the provincial government has begun the negotiations process, the central government should support its efforts by introducing enforcement mechanisms so that both sides can stick to their side of the agreement.  The government must present a unified front in its approach to militants so as not to appear divided.  Also, the devil is in the details and the government must define clearly the mechanics of the deal: for instance, who will man the Qazi courts, what their qualifications will be, what the Federal Shariat Court’s dynamic will be with the Qazi courts, etc.  At the same time, the government must take concrete steps to bolster law enforcement in the area, so as to ensure proper implementation of the agreement.   

We asked Mehlaqa to provide us a background to the Swat issue and to also address some key questions.  Here’s Mehlaqa insightful analysis.

Brief Background to Swat Issue: 

The current conflict in Swat can be traced back to the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by coalition forces, which led to the toppling of the Taliban regime.  At the time, Maulana Sufi Mohammad, the head of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a religious/militant organization in Swat that had agitated for the imposition of Shariah in the Malakand region since the early 1990s, took close to 10,000 young men to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan.   

A couple of months later, defeated, discredited and demoralized, he returned to Swat with only a handful of men, with the rest having been killed in battle.   Given the level of local hostility against him, he was taken into protective custody by the Pakistani government.  

Sufi Mohammad founded the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a religious organization in the 1980s having freshly returned from waging jihad in Afghanistan.  The TNSM agitated for the imposition of Shariah in the Malakand region and twice (in 1994 and 1999) the government came close to acceding to Sufi Mohammad’s demands.  However, both times failure to implement the Shariat Ordinance by the government led to greater radicalization and frustration.     

After Sufi Mohammad’s detention, his young son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, filled the leadership vacuum and took over as the head of TNSM.   Fazlullah proved to be more wily and radical than his father-in-law.  He adopted the use of illegal FM radios to spread and preach a rigid interpretation of Islam to the local population, set up parallel judicial structures and actively resorted to violence against secular politicians and military personnel in his efforts to impose his version of the Shariah.  At one point, his imprisoned father-in-law disowned him for his use of violence to achieve his religious goals.  Last year, under the auspices of the ANP-led provincial government, the government released Sufi Mohammad so as to use him to mediate a deal between the government and Maulana Fazlullah.  By then, Fazlullah had formally joined the Tehreek-e-Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud who appointed Fazlullah the head of TTP’s Swat  chapter.  However, the peace agreement did not last given a lack of coordination between the provincial and federal governments.   

Unable to quell Fazlullah’s growing influence, the Pakistani government launched a three-phase, all out offensive against the Taliban in Swat in August 2007.  In the ensuing 18 month conflict, more than 1200 civilians were killed in the area and more than 400,000 displaced internally.  The government failed to eliminate the Taliban, who had only grown in strength, and continued to violently impose their perverse version of Islam on the local population by burning girls’ schools, banning music and other similar forms of entertainment, etc.   

Finally as a way to end the violence, the government agreed to the imposition of Shariah in the Malakand region by signing a peace agreement with Sufi Mohammad, in the hope that he would convince the Taliban to lay down their arms.   

How to best frame the conflict: 

The conflict in Swat can best be attributed to structural causes whereby breakdown in government authority and the rule of law resulted in the emergence of a radical religious movement that has sought to fill the vacuum.  In the absence of a unified government response to rising militancy, radicalization in the region has only grown.   

While it is difficult to determine the breadth of their political/religious objectives, at the very least, Sufi Mohammad and Fazlullah are interested in imposing Shariah in the Malakand region and adjoining areas.  While they may very well want to see their version of Islamic law imposed on all of Pakistan, they see this as difficult given the lack of popular support for such a move.  They also want to dislodge foreign forces from neighbouring Afghanistan and want to see the Taliban back in power over there.  

Current Peace Deal:  

The most recent peace deal concluded between the provincial government and Sufi Mohammad on February 16, was an agreement that allowed for the imposition of Nizam-e-Adl or a system of justice based on the Shariah.  It was decided that civil cases would be adjudicated within 6 months and criminal cases within 4 months.  In exchange for the government’s decision to impose the Nizam-e-Adl, Sufi Mohammad called on the Taliban to renounce violence, and have the two sides engage in prisoner swaps, etc.  

However, the peace agreement was not comprehensive as it did not address critical questions such as, whose version of the Shariah will be implemented in Swat, who the Qazi courts will be manned by, what their qualifications will be, etc.  

The peace agreement is tenuous at best.  With Zardari reluctant to sign off on it, Sufi Mohammad has threatened to withdraw from the agreement*.  The peace agreement was signed between the provincial government and Sufi Mohammad but required Zardari’s signatures for the Nizam-e-Adl regulation to become law and be implemented.   

A few weeks after the peace agreement in Swat was signed, there was another peace deal (an extension of the Swat peace deal) struck between Maulvi Faqir Mohammad (TTP head in Bajaur and Baitullah Mehsud’s deputy) and the government, whereby Maulvi Faqir ordered all militants in the area to lay down their arms, refuse shelter to foreign militants and cease all attacks against government security forces.   It is unclear what the status of the Bajaur peace agreement will be if the Swat agreement is derailed.   

Response to the peace agreement:  

When the peace agreement was first signed, it received widespread support from the people of Swat primarily because it brought an end to 18 months of unrelenting violence.  Immediately following the agreement, the Taliban announced a 10-day ceasefire as a goodwill gesture.  The Nizam-e-Adl regulation is also supposed to provide the people of Swat with access to speedy justice, something they have been calling for since Swat’s annexation to Pakistan in 1969.   

Secular sections of Pakistan and the West in general were extremely apprehensive and highly critical of the deal.  Europe and the US felt that like previous deals this will allow the Taliban to regroup and having made peace with the Pakistani government, the militants would likely focus their energies on NATO forces in Afghanistan.   

Opposition to the deal in Pakistan varies from those who consider parallel judicial systems problematic, to those who worry that a strict interpretation of the Shariah will result in human rights violations of women in the region, to those who feel the government capitulated to Taliban demands under pressure and from a position of weakness to those who fear a spread of Talibanization across Pakistan.     

The ‘Emerald Question’:  

Four months ago, the Taliban in Swat managed to take control of emerald mines in Swat, which were previously government-controlled.  Apparently, the government has made few attempts to re-capture these mines and the Taliban have employed a number of people to work at the mines.  While the conflict in Swat is not a competition for natural resources, the emeralds in this case, could serve to perpetuate the conflict by financing the Taliban side of it.  Among other sources, the Taliban in recent years have relied on drugs and ransom money to finance their armed movement.   

How should extremism be combated in general in Pakistan? 

The scourge of extremism will have to be addressed at many different levels and over a sustained period of time, before we begin to see results.   

First, the Pakistani government will need to develop consensus among all elements of national power—the military, law enforcement, intelligence—and develop a coherent strategy to combat terrorism.  Until now, the government’s response has alternated between large scale military operations and peace negotiations, neither of which has succeeded in the absence of a unifying vision to tackle militancy.   

The strategy should not only determine the government’s approach to the plethora of militant organizations in Swat and the tribal belt but must also address sectarian organizations and those that have previously been active in Kashmir.  Most of these organizations have overlapping ideologies and agendas and have used similar tactics in targeting Pakistani citizens.   

Once a national strategy has been drafted, it should be shared with the public, so as to initiate a nationwide discussion on the issue. The parliament, civil society organisations, academics, defence analysts, students, etc. should all be given the opportunity to give their feedback through nationwide debates, seminars and roundtables. These groups should also be invited to participate in the implementation of the policy.

For instance, educationists could be asked to evaluate existing curricula and recommend changes for those that promote intolerance and extremism. Scientists could be hired to jam the transmission of illegal FM radios in Swat and the media could coordinate efforts in sending out public service messages against violent extremism. This process will allow the people of Pakistan to have a stake in the campaign against extremism and its outcome. 

Finally, huge investments need to be made in bolstering Pakistan’s law-enforcement capacity.  Bombing towns and cities will not root out terrorists--ultimately, it is an efficient law-enforcement infrastructure that limits the space available to militants to operate with impunity, increases the likelihood of terrorists being apprehended and cases being investigated. (this response was mostly taken from my most recent article on counter-terrorism) 

Thank you Mehlaqa for taking the time to talk to us about yourself and about Swat.  Till next time,

Khuda Hafiz,

Aaliya Naqvi-Hai

*Editor’s Note: Since this analysis was done, President Zardari has signed off on the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation. 

 Publications 2008-09

Public support for Counter-terrorism, Daily Times, April 7, 2009
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C04%5C07%5Cstory_7-4-2009_pg3_2

Pakistan and Afghanistan on the Brink, February 21, 2009
http://forums.csis.org/pcrproject/?p=875

Missing in Pakistan, Daily Times, Pakistan January 9, 2009
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C01%5C08%5Cstory_8-1-2009_pg3_2

Between Bush and Bin Laden, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 24, 2008
http://www.feer.com/international-relations/2008/july/between-bush-and-bin-laden

Preparing for Peace in Pakistan, FPIF, June 13, 2008
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5296

A New Course for Pakistan, May 14, 2008
http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4488

Dealing with Extremism in Pakistan, March 20, 2008
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C03%5C20%5Cstory_20-3-2008_pg3_4